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Michael B. Devereux and Charles Engel
6.1 Introduction
The modern literature on the choice of ﬁxed versus ﬂexible exchange
rate regimes traces back to Friedman (1953). Friedman’s contribution
emphasized the enhanced ﬂexibility of relative prices aﬀorded by ﬂoating
exchange rates in a world where nominal goods prices adjust slowly. A
country can be insulated to some degree from foreign demand shocks un-
der ﬂoating exchange rates because relative price movements absorb some
of the changes in demand that would have to be met by changes in quanti-
ties produced under ﬁxed exchange rates.
Friedman’s early work was supplemented and reﬁned in the 1960s by
Mundell (1960, 1961a, 1961b, 1963), who explored the role of capital mo-
bility in the choice of exchange rate regimes. Whether ﬁxed or ﬂoating
exchange rates are better depends in Mundell’s work on whether the source
of shocks was monetary or real, on the degree of capital and other factor
mobility, and on the relative size of countries.
A large body of literature in the 1970s and 1980s, in turn, extended
Mundell’s work by incorporating a role for expectations. Contributors
include Turnovsky (1976, 1983), Fischer (1977), Hamada and Sakurai
(1978), Flood (1979), Flood and Marion (1982), Weber (1981), Kim-
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163brough (1983), Aizenman and Frenkel (1985), and Glick and Wihlborg
(1990). These papers evaluated the optimality of exchange rate regimes on
ad hoc criteria, generally involving variance of output and inﬂation.
We investigate the optimality of exchange rate regimes from a welfare
maximization standpoint. Others have studied the welfare properties of al-
ternative exchange rate systems, including Lapan and Enders (1980), Help-
man (1981), Helpman and Razin (1982), Eaton (1985), Aizenman (1994),
Chinn and Miller (1998), and Neumeyer (1998). These papers, however, do
not assume any sort of nominal price stickiness, and therefore do not fol-
low directly in the tradition of Friedman and Mundell.
The model we use is a two-country, inﬁnite horizon model of optimiza-
tion under uncertainty. Consumers get utility from consumption, leisure,
and real balances. We assume perfect capital mobility in the model be-
cause we allow a complete market of state-contingent nominal bonds. The
sources of uncertainty are random monetary shocks at home and abroad.
We assume that monopolistic ﬁrms must set nominal prices prior to the
realization of monetary shocks. Prices adjust fully after one period.
Two important features of the economy that we examine are motivated
in part by the empirical research of Robert Lipsey. First is the nature of
how price setting aﬀects the optimal choice of exchange rate regime. Fried-
man and Mundell assumed that producers set prices in their own curren-
cies, and that those prices do not adjust when exchange rates change. In-
deed, in their models, the law of one price (LOP) holds for all goods.
Lipsey has demonstrated how poor the LOP assumption is. The seminal
paper in this regard is Kravis and Lipsey (1978).1 That paper demonstrates
that prices show substantial deviations from purchasing power parity.
Moreover, relative prices move with exchange rates: Countries with weaker
currencies have lower prices. These movements appear to be attributable
to a large extent to failures of the LOP: “There are reasons for believing
that there may be substantial deviations from the law of one price even for
traded goods” (p. 227). Furthermore, it appears from microeconomic data
that ﬁrms set diﬀerent prices for consumers in diﬀerent countries. Kravis
and Lipsey conclude, “A given seller may charge diﬀerent prices for a given
product to diﬀerent destinations” (p. 234), and, “Price discrimination is
quite common in international trade” (p. 234).
More recent empirical research conﬁrms those ﬁndings.2 Lipsey and
Swedenborg (1996) conclude that even for highly tradable food items, a
signiﬁcant temporary factor aﬀecting relative prices across countries is ex-
change rate movements. We conclude that a better description of price
1. See also Kravis and Lipsey (1987).
2. See especially Engel (1993, 1999), Rogers and Jenkins (1995), and Engel and Rogers
(1996).
164 Michael B. Devereux and Charles Engelsetting is that nominal prices are sticky in the currency of the consumer;
we refer to this type of price stickiness as pricing-to-market.
We have argued that the type of price stickiness may be of critical im-
portance in the analysis of ﬁxed versus ﬂoating exchange rates (Devereux
and Engel 1998). We ﬁnd that under ﬂoating exchange rates and pricing-
to-market, foreign monetary shocks do not aﬀect domestic consumption.3
In contrast, when prices are set in the producers’ currencies, the prices
paid by home residents for foreign goods change as the exchange rate
changes. This introduces a channel through which the foreign monetary
shocks can aﬀect domestic consumption. The larger the share of foreign
goods in consumption, the more vulnerable consumption will be to foreign
money shocks. The type of pricing behavior also inﬂuences the average
levels of prices, consumption, and leisure under ﬂoating exchange rates.
We extend our earlier paper by examining the role of the price-setting
behavior of ﬁrms when there is internationalized production. Lipsey’s em-
pirical work has documented the large and increasing role for multina-
tional corporations (MNCs) in U.S. and world production. Lipsey (1998)
ﬁnds that internationalized production grew from 4.5 percent of world
output in 1970 to 7 percent of world output in 1995. In manufacturing,
the share rose from 12 percent in 1970 to 16 percent in 1990 (and probably
much higher by 1995). Blomstro ¨m, Fors, and Lipsey (1997) ﬁnd that U.S.
ﬁrms allocated more labor-intensive operations to foreign aﬃliates. Kravis
and Lipsey (1982, 1992) and Lipsey (1988, 1993) document the increasing
role of multinational production for U.S. ﬁrms.
For purposes of comparison with standard models that assume no inter-
nationalized production, we make the extreme assumption that all produc-
tion for export occurs in foreign aﬃliates. Kravis and Lipsey (1992) docu-
ment that by the late 1980s, U.S. multinationals exported more from their
foreign aﬃliates abroad than from the United States.
The model in this paper of ﬂoating exchange rates with prices set in the
producer’s currency is based on Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998). That model,
in turn, is inﬂuenced by the nonstochastic models of Corsetti and Pesenti
(1998) and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995). These models are examples of re-
cent international models with optimizing agents and prices that are sticky
in producers’ currencies, and include Svensson and van Wijnbergen
(1989), Kollman (1996), and Hau (2000).
Our pricing-to-market model shares some of the characteristics of Bac-
chetta and van Wincoop’s (1998) examination of how exchange rate regime
aﬀects the volume of trade and capital ﬂows in a stochastic two-period
model of pricing-to-market. Our model of pricing-to-market is also related
3. However, we shall see that foreign monetary variance may inﬂuence the expected level
of home consumption.
The Optimal Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 165to the work of Betts and Devereux (1996, 1998, 2000). Other recent general
equilibrium models in which prices are sticky in consumers’ currencies
include Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1997), Tille (1998a, 1998b), and
Engel (1996).
None of the aforementioned models, however, allow for any internation-
alized production. We believe it is a ﬁtting tribute to Robert Lipsey to
demonstrate how some of Lipsey’s empirical ﬁndings have implications for
policy making and for open-economy macroeconomic modeling. Lipsey’s
work shows clearly the need to abandon the assumption of the LOP, and
the increasing importance of allowing for internationalized production in
our models.
The general models are laid out in section 6.2. In section 6.3, we investi-
gate the welfare comparisons of ﬁxed versus ﬂoating exchange rates under
the two models of price-setting behavior. Section 6.4 compares the results
with those of Devereux and Engel (1998), so that we can ascertain the
role of internationalized production. The concluding section (6.5) points
to some potential weaknesses of our analysis and directions for future re-
search.
6.2 The Model
Here we lay out the main features of the models we examine. The model
for consumers follows exactly that of Devereux and Engel (1998), which
in turn closely follows the model of consumption in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1998). Consumers maximize expected lifetime utility, taking prices and
wages as given. Firm managers make production and pricing decisions.
Each consumer receives a share of proﬁts from every ﬁrm in which he or
she owns shares. Monetary authorities in each country let the money
supply ﬂuctuate randomly in the ﬂoating exchange rate models, and this is
the only source of uncertainty in the model. In the ﬁxed exchange rate
model, the foreign monetary authority determines the foreign money
supply (randomly), while the domestic central bank controls the domestic
money supply in order to keep the exchange rate ﬁxed.
Our models include sticky goods prices. Producers must set prices prior
to the realization of monetary shocks. One could justify this constraint
with an appropriate menu cost model, though we do not model this and
simply view the stickiness of prices as an institutional constraint. Prices
adjust fully to monetary shocks after one period. There is no persistence
to the price adjustment process. We consider two separate types of price
setting. In the ﬁrst type, producers must set prices in their own currencies.
For example, the home-currency price of home goods is preset and unre-
sponsive to monetary shocks. This implies that the price for home goods
paid by foreign consumers varies when the exchange rate changes in re-
166 Michael B. Devereux and Charles Engelsponse to monetary shocks. In the other type of model, producers preset
prices in consumers’ currencies. Home ﬁrms set one price for home-
country consumers in the home currency and another price for foreign-
country consumers in the foreign currency. In the ﬁxed exchange rate
model, the currency in which prices are set is irrelevant since the exchange
rate is assumed to be ﬁxed permanently. In each of the models, the objec-
tive of the ﬁrm managers is to maximize the expected utility of the repre-
sentative owner of the ﬁrm.
We shall contrast the choice of exchange rate regime when all produc-
tion by home ﬁrms is accomplished with domestic factors of production
(as in Devereux and Engel 1998), with a production conﬁguration in which
the domestic ﬁrm produces goods for sale to foreigners using foreign fac-
tors of production. Similarly, goods sold by the foreign ﬁrm to home resi-
dents are produced by home-country factors. The sense in which these
goods can be classiﬁed as home and foreign becomes ambiguous in this
case. Since asset markets are complete, the ownership of the ﬁrm is not
important. We specify home ﬁrms as being owned by home residents, but
a complete set of contingent claims makes this deﬁnition irrelevant. Thus,
internationalized production means nothing more or less than the assump-
tion that each monopolistic ﬁrm locates production for home-country resi-
dents in the home country and for foreign-country residents in the for-
eign country.
6.2.1 Consumers





















































There are n identical individuals in the home country, 0  n  1, and 1 
n in the foreign country. Ch and Cf, in turn, are indexes over consumption
of goods produced at home and in the foreign country, respectively:
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The elasticity of substitution between any two goods produced within a
country is , which we assume to be greater than 1. There is a unit elastic-
ity of substitution between the home goods and foreign goods bundles.
M/P represents domestic real balances, and L is the labor supply of the
representative home agent.
The utility function we consider here is one case investigated by Dever-
eux and Engel (1998). They examine a more general welfare function in
which real balances enter as a power function, and labor enters quadrati-
cally. We choose this simpler representation for utility here because the
model can be solved analytically in closed form for this welfare function,
while the more general welfare function requires us to use second-order
Taylor series approximations.
We justify the linearity of labor on two grounds. First, some literature
has found that when individuals face a discrete choice of working a ﬁxed
number of hours or not working at all, the appropriate aggregate represen-
tation for leisure in the utility function is linear.4 Second, we do not believe
there is a strong tradition in economics of considering the eﬀects of risk-
averse behavior toward uncertainty about consumption of leisure. Risk
neutrality toward leisure is probably a plausible assumption.5
P, the price index, is deﬁned by
(1) PP P h
n
f
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The preferences of foreign consumers are similar to those of home-
country residents. The terms in the utility function involving consumption
are identical in the two countries. Note that this implies that if the LOP
should hold for both goods, then purchasing power parity obtains Pt  St
P* t , where St is the home-currency price of foreign currency. The functional
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4. See Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988).
5. The existence of overtime pay, however, suggests that there is some desire to smooth
leisure.form for real balances and labor are also the same, but, for foreign resi-
dents, they are functions of foreign real balances and foreign labor supply.
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We assume that there is a set of state-contingent nominal bonds. As
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1998) emphasize, the structure of the utility func-
tions ensures that there is complete consumption risk sharing when the
LOP holds, regardless of what assets are traded.6 However, the LOP does
not hold in the pricing-to-market model. We consider the assumption of
complete asset markets to be convenient, and an approximation to the
assumption of perfect capital mobility.
Given the intratemporal consumption choices just given, the budget
constraint of the representative home agent is
PC M q z z B z WL M B T tt t t
tt t
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where B(zt
1) are contingent home-currency denominated nominal bonds
whose prices at time t are q(zt
1, zt), zt represents the state at timet, t is the
representative agent’s share of proﬁts from all home ﬁrms, Tt represents
monetary transfers from the government, and Wt is the wage rate.7
In addition to the consumption demand equations, we can derive the






































The trade-oﬀ between consumption and leisure is given by
6. See Cole and Obstfeld (1991) for an analysis of how the terms of trade changes can
serve as a substitute for capital mobility.
7. To avoid excess notation, we will not continue to use this state-contingent notation from
here on. The important point to remember is that complete asset markets are necessary to
sustain the full risk-sharing condition in equation (4).
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Before turning to the role of government, and the production and pric-
ing decisions of ﬁrms, it is convenient to express the equilibrium condition





















There are immediately two important things that arise out of condition
(4). First, when the LOP holds (as it does in the PCP and FER models,
deﬁned in section 6.2.3), then home consumption always equals foreign
consumption: Ct  C* t .8
Second, factor price equalization holds. This arises immediately out of
equations (3) and (4), and does not require that the LOP hold for either
good. We have
WS W tt t *. =
6.2.2 Government
Government alters the money supply with direct transfers. The govern-
ment budget constraint (in per capita terms) is
MMT tt t        . =+ −1
6.2.3 Firms
Here we shall discuss the production and pricing decisions for ﬁrms
with internationalized production. Ultimately we will contrast our welfare
results in this model with those in Devereux and Engel (1998). That paper
assumes all production by home ﬁrms takes place domestically, and all
production by foreign ﬁrms takes place in the foreign country.
Firms are assumed to be monopolistic competitors. The production
function by the home-country ﬁrm i for sale to domestic residents is
given by
Xi L i ht t ()   () . =
So, total output sold to domestic residents by ﬁrm i, Xht(i), is produced
using only labor. Similarly, the production function for sales to foreign
consumers by ﬁrm i is given by
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8. It is not necessary that markets be complete to sustain this condition in the PCP model.Xi L i ht t *()   *() . =
The objective of the domestic ﬁrms is to set prices to maximize the
expected utility of the owners, who are the domestic residents. Firms must
set prices before information about the random domestic and foreign
money supplies is known. We will consider three models:
PCP: PCP refers to producer-currency pricing. Producers set the price in
their own currencies. The price that foreigners pay for home goods, and
the price that home residents pay for foreign goods, ﬂuctuates when the
exchange rate changes. This model is examined by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1995, 1998).
PTM: PTM refers to pricing-to-market. Producers set the price in the
consumers’ currency. Prices consumers face do not respond to exchange
rate changes. A PTM model was introduced by Devereux and Engel
(1998).
FER: FER refers to permanently ﬁxed exchange rates. Prices are set ahead
of time, but the choice of currency is irrelevant since there is essentially
a single currency.
No state-contingent pricing of goods is allowed in the three models.
The ﬁrm owners maximize the expected present value of proﬁts using
the market nominal discount factor for the owners of the ﬁrm. This is
equivalent to maximizing expected utility of the owners. In the PCP
model, the ﬁrms choose a single price for both markets. Given that there
is no intertemporal aspect to the ﬁrms’ optimization problems (see Obst-
feld and Rogoﬀ 1998), for the domestic ﬁrm this reduces to maximizing
Ed P i W X i P i S W Xi t t ht t ht ht t t ht − −+ − 1( {[ ( )   ] ( )   [ ( )   *] *() } ) .
Given that factor price equalization holds in all of our models, this objec-
tive function can be simpliﬁed to
Ed P i W Xi Xi t t ht t ht ht − −+ 1({ [ ( )    ] [ ( )    *() ] } ) .
Then, using the fact that home and foreign consumption are equal in























































The Optimal Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 171In a world of certainty, the price would be a markup over unit labor costs.
Here, there is a risk premium incorporated in the goods price (as discussed
by Bacchetta and van Wincoop 1998, and Devereux and Engel 1998) aris-
ing from the covariance of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts with the marginal utility of
consumption.
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(8) PS P ft t ft *. =
In the PTM model, the ﬁrm chooses two diﬀerent prices—one for resi-
dents of its own country, and one for residents of the other country. The
typical home ﬁrm maximizes
E d P i Xi S Pi X i W Xi X i t t ht ht t ht ht t ht ht − +− + 1( { () ()    *() *()    [ ()    *() ] } ) ,
where we have used factor price equalization. The price charged by the
home ﬁrm to the home residents is the same as in the PCP model, and is
given in equation (5). But, making use of the risk-sharing condition (4),




















































Likewise, the price charged by foreign ﬁrms to its own residents is the
same as in the PCP model, and is given by equation (7), but the price



















































Comparing equation (10) to equation (5), we see that in the PTM model,
home residents pay exactly the same price for the home and the foreign
good. Likewise, equations (9) and (7) show that the foreign resident pays
the same price for the two goods (although the prices do not necessarily
equal the price paid by home residents).
In the FER model, the exchange rate is ﬁxed at all times, so the pricing
172 Michael B. Devereux and Charles Engelrule is the same whether the ﬁrms state prices in their own currencies or
the foreign currency.
Equilibrium in the home market for labor requires that labor employed












       (    ) . =+ − 1
In both of the models with ﬂoating exchange rates, some simpliﬁcations
of equation (11) are readily derived. In the PTM model, we note that since
Pht  Pft  Pt,w ea r r i v ea t
(12) LC tt   . =
The logic of that relationship is straightforward. Since the relative price of
home goods to foreign goods is always one, and both goods are produced
by domestic labor, then the amount of labor demanded will equal the
amount of the good consumed (since the production function is Yt  Lt).




























































Equations (11), (13), and (14) then tell us in the PCP model
(15) EL EC tt t t −−
− = −
11




These equations suﬃce to solve the three models. In the next section,
we will analyze welfare under ﬁxed exchange rates, and under the two
models of ﬂoating exchange rates.
6.3 Welfare Comparisons
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An analogous equation holds for the foreign country.
This equation implies that the home and foreign nominal interest rates
must be constant. The ex post real interest rate is determined by the rate
of change of consumption: Higher consumption growth is associated with
higher real interest rates.
Consider a monetary expansion in the home country under ﬂexible ex-
change rates. In each of our models, a monetary expansion lowers the real
interest rate. Since money is neutral in the long run (i.e., after one period),
current consumption must grow. A monetary expansion also leads to ex-
pected inﬂation. The future domestic price level increases more than the
current price level in each of our models. When money enters the utility
function logarithmically, the increase in expected inﬂation exactly oﬀsets
the decline in the real interest rate, leaving the nominal interest rate un-
changed.
It follows immediately that in both the PCP and PTM models, the ex-
change rate must follow a random walk. In our model, uncovered interest
parity may not hold exactly, because there may be a foreign exchange risk
premium. However, under assumptions that will be introduced shortly
(speciﬁcally, that the variance of monetary shocks is constant over time),
the risk premium is constant. Since domestic and foreign interest rates are
also constant, the expected change in the (log of) the nominal exchange
rate must be zero. Because money is neutral in the long run, the current
change in the exchange rate is proportional to changes in domestic money
(with a positive sign) and foreign money (with a negative sign). In fact,

















We can now derive one of the chief results of this section: In the PTM
model, foreign monetary shocks have no eﬀect on domestic consumption,
b u tt h e yd oa ﬀect home consumption in the PCP model. Recall that P 
Pn
h P1n
f . In the PTM model, P is predetermined, so it is not aﬀected by
foreign (or domestic) money shocks. It follows from equation (17) that
domestic consumption is determined in the short run entirely by the do-
mestic money supply. Changes in the foreign money supply have no eﬀect
on domestic consumption. In contrast, in the PCP model, Pf increases
when the price of the foreign currency increases, since that price is ﬁxed
174 Michael B. Devereux and Charles Engelin foreign currency terms; thus, a 1 percent jump in the foreign money
supply leads toa1p e r c e n td e c r e a s ei nS,a1p e r c e n td e c r e a s ei nPf,a n d
a1 n percent decline in P. So, a 1 percent increase in the foreign money
supply induces a (1  n)/
 percent increase in C.
We have compared the two ﬂoating exchange rate models (PCP and
PTM). How do these models compare to the ﬁxed exchange rate (FER)
model? To keep exchange rates ﬁxed, the domestic money supply must
move in proportion to the foreign money supply (see equation [18]). It fol-
l o w st h a ti nr e s p o n s et oa1p e r c e n tshock to the foreign money supply, the
domestic money supply must change 1 percent. Since goods prices do not
change, equation (17) tells us there must be a 1/
 percent change in domes-
tic consumption.
If our only concern were how the variance of foreign money shocks
aﬀected the variance of domestic consumption, it would be clear that
ﬂoating rates dominate ﬁxed exchange rates. Under ﬁxed rates, a 1 per-
cent shock to foreign money leads to a 1/
 percent change in domestic
consumption, compared to a change in domestic consumption of only
(1  n)/
 percent in the PCP model, and 0 percent in the PTM model.
Table 6.1 shows how the variance of (the log of) consumption is related
to the variance of (the log of) the foreign money supply in each model.9
However, the variance of consumption is not the only welfare consider-
ation. Even ignoring the eﬀect on welfare coming from money in the utility
function, the variance of foreign monetary shocks has further eﬀects on
utility. Leisure enters utility linearly, so greater variance of output (and
hence leisure) does not directly inﬂuence welfare—but, the variance of for-
eign monetary shocks has further eﬀects on welfare because it inﬂuences
the means of both consumption and leisure. This channel arises from the
eﬀects that monetary variances have on goods prices.
We assume shocks to money supplies are log-normally distributed. Us-
ing equation (16):





ln( ) ,  
9. These results are derived formally in the appendix in equations (A9), (A16), and (A23).











The Optimal Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 175where mt is the log of Mt (we will follow the convention that lowercase
letters are logs of uppercase letters), t
1 is the white noise shock to domes-
tic money, and 2
m is the variance of t
1. An analogous equation holds for
the foreign money supply process.




cm p tt t =− + − ln , 1
(21) smm ttt =− + − − − * ln( ) ln( * ). 11   
In log terms, equation (3) can be written as
(22) wp c tt t =+ + 
 ln( ),
and analogously for the foreign country.
The solutions for goods prices, consumption, and leisure depend on the
particular model of price-setting behavior. The appendix derives solutions
in terms of the exogenous variables—the domestic and foreign money sup-
plies—for each of our models.
The average levels of consumption and leisure can be diﬀerent de-
pending on the exchange rate regime. This may seem surprising, since it
implies that average long-run consumption depends on a monetary
choice—ﬁxed or ﬂoating exchange rates. The intuition for this outcome
can be seen from equation (3). The level of consumption is related to the
markup of prices over wages: When the markup is smaller, the level of
consumption is higher. The level of prices is aﬀected by the exchange rate
regime because the risk premium incorporated in prices diﬀers between
regimes. In turn, since labor is used to produce consumption goods, the
expected level of leisure is also diﬀerent under the diﬀerent exchange rate
regimes.
We compare the inﬂuence of the variance of foreign money shocks on
the expected level of consumption by setting the variance of domestic
money equal to zero in equations (A10), (A18), and (A24). These values
are reported in table 6.2.
From table 6.2, the expected level of consumption is higher in the FER
model compared to the PCP model when 
(2  n)/(3  2n) .As u ﬃcient
condition is 
1. The condition of 
1 is necessary and suﬃcient for
expected consumption to be higher in the FER model than in the PTM
model. Although there is little agreement empirically about the correct
value for 
, virtually all studies agree that 
1. So, while the variance of
consumption is higher for ﬁxed exchange rates than in either ﬂoating ex-
change rate model, there is a higher average level of consumption under
ﬁxed exchange rates.
176 Michael B. Devereux and Charles EngelThis implies a trade-oﬀ in utility. Examining (for now) the consumption
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Welfare is positively related to the expected level of consumption, but falls
with increases in the variance of consumption.
Utility also depends on expected leisure. The greater the average level
of employment, the lower the welfare. Table 6.3 reports the expected levels
of employment in each model (taken from equations [A12], [A18], and
[A26]).
Employment is higher under ﬁxed exchange rates, as compared to ﬂoat-
ing under PCP, when 1 
(2  n)/(1  n). When n is large (that is,
close to one), it is likely that expected employment is higher and expected
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The Optimal Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 177leisure lower under ﬁxed exchange rates. But for a small country (with n
close to zero), average employment under ﬁxed exchange rates will be
smaller unless 
 falls in the narrow range between one and two. So, in
comparing leisure eﬀects between FER and PCP, the size of the country
is quite important. On the other hand, expected employment is higher and
expected leisure lower under FER compared to PCP when 
1.
In comparing welfare under ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange rates, we look
at the eﬀects of the variance of foreign money shocks on domestic welfare.
A ﬁxed exchange rate system eliminates the possibility of domestic money
shocks, but even under ﬂoating rates central banks can choose a zero vari-
ance. Thus, we set 2
m  0 in our welfare analysis.
Real money balances enter the utility function. It may not be wise to
evaluate exchange rate systems in terms of how they aﬀect the real balance
part of the utility function. Money in the utility function is a convenient
way to create demand for an asset (money) that would otherwise be domi-
nated by other assets. However, there are other ways to model demand for
money that may be more realistic (and more complicated) that do not
involve welfare’s being directly inﬂuenced by holdings of real balances. In
making welfare comparisons, we will assume real balances are not impor-
tant in welfare ( → 0).
Utility, then, can be expressed in terms of expected consumption, the
variance of consumption, and expected leisure. Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3
compare the models for each of these components of utility. The compari-
sons seem ambiguous: FER is the worst in terms of the variance of con-
sumption, the best in terms of expected consumption, and there is some
ambiguity about the ranking in terms of expected leisure. We can further
clarify the matter by looking at all three eﬀects together.
6.3.1 PCP versus FER models
In the PCP and FER models we can use equation (15) to write the













































There is a trade-oﬀ in choosing between ﬁxed and ﬂoating exchange
rates. Fixed exchange rates have a higher expected level of consumption
(when 
[2  n]/[3  2n]), but under ﬂoating rates the variance of con-
sumption is lower.
We ﬁnd that welfare is higher under ﬂoating rates when 
(2  n)/
(1  n). When 
2, ﬂoating rates are always better. As n approaches 1,
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then ﬂoating rates dominate. This accords with the intuition that smaller
countries may ﬁnd it desirable to ﬁx their exchange rates to the currency
of a larger country, but that large countries are better oﬀ with their own
independent currencies.
As 
 increases, the ﬁxed exchange rate system’s advantage in terms of
expected consumption increases. Its disadvantage in terms of variance also
falls as the square of 
 increases, although that is oﬀset by the fact that
the importance of the variance in welfare rises with the square of 
 (see
equation [24]). On net, for large values of 
, ﬁxed exchange rates become
more desirable.
6.3.2 PTM versus FER Models
We have seen from table 6.1 that foreign monetary variance does not
aﬀect either the mean or the variance of consumption in the PTM model.
Compared to the FER model, the variance of consumption is lower, but
the mean of consumption is also lower when 
1. The PTM model has
the advantage in terms of expected leisure when 
1.
As is the case with the PCP and FER models (equation [15]), we have
E(L)  [(1)/()]E(C1
). In the PTM model, this follows from equa-
tions (12) and (A14). Thus, conveniently, the analysis simpliﬁes to a com-
parison of the models in terms of expected consumption and variance of
consumption. Equation (24) holds in the PTM model as well as the other
two models.
Utility in the PTM model is not inﬂuenced by foreign monetary policy






























This can be compared directly to welfare in the FER model:










































It is clear from examination of these equations that any variance in for-
eign money shocks lowers welfare in the FER model, so that
Eu Eu () () PTM FER >
for all admissible parameter values. Even though, when 
1, there may
be less expected consumption under ﬂoating exchange rates and PTM, the
fact that home consumption is completely insulated from foreign money
shocks is enough to insure that ﬂoating rates always dominate ﬁxed ex-
change rates in this model.
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How do the comparisons between levels of welfare under ﬁxed and
ﬂoating exchange rates in the models of this paper, with internationalized
production, relate to the comparisons in Devereux and Engel (1998) in
which there is no internationalized production?
There are surprising similarities in the welfare comparisons. A major
reason the welfare comparisons are not very diﬀerent regardless of whether
we assume internationalized production is that there is factor price equal-
ization in our model. Since home-country wages equal foreign-country
wages, the prices set by ﬁrms are the same whether domestic labor or for-
eign labor produces output. That is, there is a risk premium incorporated
in nominal goods prices arising from the covariance of labor costs with
revenues. However, that risk is the same whether domestic or foreign labor
is employed because the two types of labor are paid the same wage.
Why is there factor price equalization? From equation (3), the marginal
utility of taking one more dollar’s worth of leisure, /Wt, is equal to the
marginal utility from one more dollar’s worth of consumption, C

t /Pt. That
is, each agent works only so much that the last dollar earned creates as
much utility from consumption as it does disutility from working; but our
assumption of perfect capital mobility and complete nominal asset mar-
kets means that the marginal utility of a dollar for the home-country resi-
dent is worth the same for the foreign agent: C

t /Pt  C*

t /StP* t . Together,
these imply that the dollar value of wages must be the same in the two
countries: Wt  StW* t . In short, the complete asset market in nominal
bonds assures that the marginal value of a dollar spent on leisure is the
same in the two countries: /Wt  /StW* t .
Since wage equalization implies that the nominal price set by ﬁrms is
not aﬀected by the location of production, then neither exchange rates nor
consumption levels (from equation [17]) are aﬀected by the location of
production. Thus, any welfare comparison involving consumption is not
inﬂuenced by whether there is internationalized production.
Welfare is also inﬂuenced by leisure. One would expect that term to be
diﬀerent depending on where production is located. In Devereux and En-
gel (1998), domestic workers produce goods consumed by foreigners, so
movements in foreign demand for domestic goods change employment.
However, in the model of this paper, domestic workers produce only for
domestic consumption: They produce both the home and the foreign
goods for home consumers.
Surprisingly, in the PCP model, even the leisure term is not aﬀected by
the location of production. In the PCP model, as Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1998) emphasize, the current account is always balanced. Even though
there is perfect capital mobility, the unitary elasticity of demand between
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ensures that the value of goods purchased from abroad by home residents
continuously equals the value of goods sold to foreign residents by home
ﬁrms. However, the prices of home goods and foreign goods are expected
to be the same (prior to the realization of monetary shocks). Since the
values of exports and imports are equal, and the expected prices are the
same, the expected quantity of goods produced by home ﬁrms for foreign
residents always equals the expected quantity of goods produced by for-
eign ﬁrms for home residents. It does not matter where the goods are pro-
duced—expected employment will not be aﬀected by the location of pro-
duction.
Welfare in the PCP model is not aﬀected by the presence of internation-
alized production. The same is true for the FER model, since, given the
structure of the model, the FER model is identical to the PCP model with
n  1. The welfare comparisons for this paper between the PCP and FER
worlds are exactly the same as in Devereux and Engel (1998) for these
two models.
Expected leisure in the PTM model does depend on where output is
produced. In the model of this paper, where domestic labor produces only
for home consumers, there is no inﬂuence of foreign money shocks on
expected employment. In the model of Devereux and Engel (1998), foreign
money shocks change domestic employment because they aﬀect foreign
demand for home goods (which, in that model, are produced with domes-
tic labor). In that model, when 
1, a higher foreign monetary variance
raises expected demand for home goods and lowers expected home leisure,
so that expected domestic leisure is higher when there is internationalized
production. Still, regardless of whether there is internationalized produc-
tion, ﬂoating rates in the PTM model always yield higher expected utility
than do ﬁxed exchange rates.
6.5 Conclusions
We ﬁnd that the hypothesis of how prices are set has implications for
the optimal choice of exchange rate regime. If we follow the traditional
literature in assuming that prices are set in producers’ currencies, and that
the law of one price holds, there is no clear-cut answer on which regime is
preferable. When a country is small, or very risk averse, it would prefer
ﬁxed exchange rates; otherwise, ﬂoating exchange rates are preferred.
However, the empirical evidence supports the model of pricing in which
producers set diﬀerent prices in diﬀerent markets. Prices are set in consum-
ers’ currencies and adjust slowly to demand shocks. In that case, we ﬁnd
that ﬂoating exchange rates are unambiguously preferred to ﬁxed ex-
change rates.
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duction in the model. Indeed, we ﬁnd under pricing-to-market that the
economy is even more sheltered from foreign shocks in a ﬂoating exchange
rate system than in a world in which all production of the domestic ﬁrm
takes place in the home country. The reason is straightforward: One poten-
tial avenue for foreign shocks to hit the home economy is through employ-
ment changes in response to changes in foreign demand for the home
good. If a monetary shock abroad changes foreign demand for the home
good, that event may alter domestic employment; but, to the extent that
the foreign demand is met by production by foreign subsidiaries of the
home country, domestic employment is sheltered from the foreign shock.
Thus one avenue through which foreign shocks could aﬀect domestic em-
ployment and welfare under a ﬂoating exchange rate system with pricing-
to-market is closed when the home good is produced internationally.
The model considered here is quite simple. We look only at a special
case examined by Devereux and Engel (1998), in which real money bal-
ances enter the utility function logarithmically and leisure enters linearly.
This speciﬁcation simpliﬁes the analysis considerably—for example, nom-
inal interest rates are constant in equilibrium; yet it also loses some of
the interesting and more realistic dynamic behavior of the more complex
models. Still, in Devereux and Engel (1998), the ﬂavor of the welfare anal-
ysis of exchange rate regimes was not appreciably altered by consideration
of the more complex model.
One important extension to this model would allow for price adjustment
that lasts longer than a single period. Indeed, it is possible that the speed
of price adjustment could diﬀer between exchange rate regimes, altering
the welfare analysis. We would also like to consider investment questions.
In this study, internationalized production is undertaken using only foreign
labor as an input. More interesting would be an analysis that allowed for
domestically owned capital to be combined with foreign labor in produc-
ing output for sale abroad.
We are not certain in which direction these extensions would tilt the
welfare analysis. However, this study has highlighted some diﬀerences in
the exchange rate systems, and the roles of price setting and international-
ized production, that would be important in any extended model.
Appendix
Recall that the pricing formulas for Pht and P* ft are the same in all three
models. Using the fact that prices and consumption will be log-normally
distributed in equilibrium, we can write equation (5) as










ln( ) ( ) ln ()
()
,  
   

where mc is the covariance of mt and ct conditional on t  1 information.
(In general, we will use the notation xz to denote covt1(xt, zt), and 2
z to
denote vart1(zt).) Similar derivations yield from equation (7):
(A2) pm ft m m c t ** ln( *) ( ) ln (* )
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Equations (A1) and (A2) hold in all three models. We will also use the
relationship
(A3) pn p n p th t f t =+ − () , 1
and the analogous expression for the foreign price level. These equations
must be augmented by equations for pft and p* ht, as well as equations for
output, in order to complete derivations in each model.
The PCP Model
The law of one price holds in this model, so
(A4) ps p ft t ft =+ * ,
(A5) pps ht ht t * . =−
Recall, also, the perfect risk-sharing property of this model, so that
ct  c* t .
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We can derive expressions for mc and m*c directly from equation (A7):














Plugging these into (A7), we arrive at our expression for domestic con-
sumption:
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The variance of domestic and foreign money shocks aﬀects utility also














2 1 =+ − () . *
The expected level of consumption is given by
(A10) EC E c
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From equations (5) and (10), we see that Pft and Pht are equal. Using


























But, since Pt is in the time t  1 information set, equation (A13) gives
us that











Writing this equation in logs gives us
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Solving, we ﬁnd

























2 1 = .
As compared to the PCP model (equation [A9]), domestic monetary vari-
ance has a greater eﬀect on the variance of domestic consumption. Substi-
tuting into equation (A15), we get





















The expected level of consumption is given by
(A18) EC E c
c




























The expected utility term involving consumption is derived directly from

















































EC m ( ) exp .
() /
From equation (12), Lt  Ct, so equation (A18) gives us the expression
for E(L).
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We will assume the exchange rate is ﬁxed at 1, so st  0 for all t.F r o m
equation (21) it follows that
(A20) mm tt +−= +− ln( ) * ln( * ). 11   
The domestic money supply moves in reaction to foreign money supply
shocks in order to keep the exchange rate ﬁxed.
Because exchange rates are ﬁxed, Pft  P* ft and Pht  P* ht. We can use
equations (A1) and (A2) to derive expressions for prices. Noting that all
prices are preset, the money demand equation (20) (combined with rela-
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We can then derive
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Then, using equation (20), we get the expression for consumption under
ﬁxed exchange rates:
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The expected level of consumption is given by
(A24) EC E c
c
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186 Michael B. Devereux and Charles EngelWe can derive the expected level of output easily as
(A26) EL EC m ( ) ( ) exp ().
/
* = − = − ⎛
⎝ ⎜
⎞































Given the structure of the model, the ﬁxed exchange rate model simply
reduces to the PCP model with n  0.
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I’ve been delegated to discuss a paper with models that have undergone
no empirical testing, in a conference on empirical international economics.
The paper discusses the role of price setting in determining the optimality
of the exchange rate regime in an environment of uncertainty created by
a monetary shock. It is the wrong paper for this conference and I am the
wrong person to discuss such a paper. The best I can do to keep to the
spirit of this conference is to raise some empirical questions related to
the approach the paper takes in dealing with the choice of an exchange
rate regime.
Two aspects of the models in the paper are noteworthy. One is that sticky
goods prices characterize the models. Prices are sticky for goods that pro-
ducers price in their own currencies, or for goods that producers price in
consumers’ currencies. The authors argue that the type of price stickiness
“may be of critical importance in the analysis of ﬁxed versus ﬂoating ex-
change rates.” The reason is that foreign monetary shocks do not aﬀect
domestic consumption under ﬂoating rates when producers price in con-
sumers’ currencies, but when producers price in their own currencies the
prices paid by home residents for foreign goods change as the exchange
rate changes. A second aspect of the models is that all production for ex-
port occurs in foreign aﬃliates.
Are Sticky Prices the Norm?
An obvious empirical question to ask is the extent of price-setting be-
havior of ﬁrms and whether the ability to set prices is limited to particular
circumstances. During the heyday of the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries, they controlled supply and were able to set the price.
Currently, crude oil prices are set in auction markets, and producers are
unable to manipulate the price (much as they would like to). What is the
signiﬁcance of the fact that the dollar is the currency in which oil prices
are set? The dollar is not the producers’ currency except for the relatively
small share of total oil exports the United States provides. Which of the
paper’s models ﬁts this case?
Which classes of exports allow producers to set their price? Suppose
there is price discrimination in a well-deﬁned set of export goods across
countries, but vigorous competition within a country among diﬀerent ex-
porters of that set of goods. This is no concern of the models.
A feature not present in the models of the paper is a distinction between
nontradables and tradables. Instead, there are goods produced at home
and goods produced in the foreign country.
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190 Michael B. Devereux and Charles EngelIs producer price behavior similar for tradables and nontradables? The
usual presumption is that producers have greater monopoly power over
nontradables than over tradables. That is the explanation for the higher
inﬂation rate in Hong Kong of nontradables than of tradables. Hong Kong
tradable goods prices move with U.S. prices because the Hong Kong dollar
exchange rate is pegged to the U.S. dollar.
The sticky prices of the models are nominal prices, whether expressed
in the currency of the home country or of the foreign country. A change
in the exchange rate times the selling country’s price, even if nominally
sticky, induces a change in the price faced by the buying country. Such
data give an indication of how much cheaper export goods become as a
result of the depreciation of a country’s currency. The literature on pass-
through provides calculations on the extent to which companies pass
through into higher export prices the changes caused by exchange rate
ﬂuctuations, and the extent to which they have absorbed the changes by
either lowering costs or lowering proﬁt margins.
The models do not distinguish countries whose tradables are produced
at home from countries whose tradables are produced by foreign aﬃliates.
How important in world trade are countries whose tradables are produced
at home compared to countries whose tradables are produced by foreign
aﬃliates? Even countries with some exports produced in foreign aﬃliates
probably also produce some exports at home. How big are the shares of
each type of country’s world trade?
Wouldn’t the optimal exchange rate for countries diﬀer depending on
where they produce tradables? Countries whose tradables are produced at
home are usually small, commodity exporters, who might be expected to
link their domestic currencies to the currencies of their major trading part-
ners. Countries whose exports are produced in foreign aﬃliates are usually
large and might be expected to ﬂoat.
Price Stickiness and Exchange Rates
It is questionable whether there is empirical support for the authors’
belief that the type of price stickiness is the key determinant of whether
to ﬁx or to ﬂoat. The record of the two decades since the end of Bretton
Woods suggests that the decision by countries to ﬁx or peg their currencies
is made to curb inﬂation, which is usually produced by imprudent mon-
etary and ﬁscal policy. The exchange rate regime does not appear to be
related to the currency in which exports are invoiced.
According to the model, in countries whose producers set prices in con-
sumers’ currencies, domestic consumption is insulated from monetary
shocks from abroad. We have an example this year of hot-rolled steel ex-
ports to the United States by Japan, Russia, and Brazil at prices that are
lower than the production costs of American steel mills. How does such a
The Optimal Choice of Exchange Rate Regime 191situation allow domestic consumption to be insulated from foreign mone-
tary shocks?
Factor Price Equalization Abstraction
There is factor price equalization in the models of the paper. Home-
country wages equal foreign-country wages, so the prices set by ﬁrms are
the same regardless of whether domestic labor or foreign labor produces
output. This assumption seems to ﬂy in the face of the reason exports are
produced in foreign aﬃliates. It is true that foreign aﬃliates are sometimes
established to counter protectionist tendencies abroad or to take advan-
tage of lower taxes in the foreign jurisdiction; but unquestionably the main
reason for moving production of exports abroad is that the cost of hiring
foreign labor is lower than the cost of domestic labor.
A conclusion reached in the paper, based on the model in which prices
are set in consumer currencies with internationalized production, is that
the domestic economy is sheltered from foreign shocks. The reasoning is
that when foreign demand for the home good declines, domestic employ-
ment is sheltered from the foreign shock because foreign subsidiaries of
the home country absorb the decline in demand. Of course, the conclusion
holds only if every single export good is produced in foreign aﬃliates. The
spillover from both the Mexican collapse in 1995 and the East Asian crises
in 1997–98 on employment in this country is a check on this conclusion.
Models and Empirical Research
Models are often simple in order to develop a tractable analysis of their
features. For example, the authors consider a speciﬁc utility function, in
which real money balances enter logarithmically and leisure enters lin-
early. What one would like to know is the extent to which the conclusions
depend on these speciﬁc assumptions. The authors claim that the welfare
analysis would not be appreciably altered by a more complex model, but
they admit that the assumption of the linearity of labor makes a diﬀerence.
What would the diﬀerence be?
In the welfare analysis, the authors consider the eﬀect on utility only of
expected consumption, the variance of consumption, and expected leisure.
Real money balances are not considered, although this term is assumed in
the utility function. Would it not be more consistent to discuss the eﬀect
of real money balances on utility, or to show that the conclusions are not
appreciably aﬀected by the omission?
The construction of the models in this paper was inspired by Bob Lip-
sey’s empirical ﬁndings that the law of one price does not hold, that price
discrimination is quite common for identical goods in international trade,
and that internationalized production increased in the past quarter-
century. I applaud this homage to Bob’s work. However, to build a model
192 Michael B. Devereux and Charles Engelin which internationalized production accounts for all exports, when at
most it can account for one-ﬁfth of world manufacturing, seems to me
to underscore the importance of testing its predictions. Models may be
admirable intellectual exercises, but they create a make-believe world.
What needs to be established is the relevance of that world to the real
world.
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